Government representatives are the main actors in an IGC. However, also other national instances take part: national parliaments, "regional" parliaments and governments, public opinions and national constitutional courts. Their power stems from the fact that ratification of treaty amendments may require their assent. See for details De Witte (note 7) at 48/49. treaty revision process and are, hence, limited to various forms of more subtle political persuasion.
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II. "Constitutional Dialogue" Between the ECJ and the Union's Pouvoir Constituant Thus, one may ask how the ECJ can manage to enter into a "constitutional debate" on Treaty revision and constitution-making which is dominated by the different national -and to some extent also supranational -political "players."
The Traditional Approach: ECJ Acts, Pouvoir Constituant Accepts
More than the other supranational EU institutions, the ECJ has the power to interpret Treaty provisions -and to give them a meaning which was not intended by the pouvoir constituant. This allows the ECJ to enter with the latter into a special form of "constitutional dialogue." For many years, this dialogue was characterized by the fact that the judiciary enjoyed a kind of "strategic advantage": the "Masters of the Treaty" were to 
A More Cautious Approach: ECJ and the Limits of EU Powers
The aforementioned reactions of the Union's pouvoir constituant and growing criticisms -expressed by academia but also by the German Federal Constitutional Court -denouncing the ECJ's "judicial activism" led the ECJ to adopt a more cautious approach.
Three landmark decisions issued during the last years may be seen as indicating the judges' turn towards a case law which pays heed to growing national concerns about the ECJ's role as a "la w maker." given to Article 28 EC which grants the free movement of goods within the EU.
In Opinion 1/94, 17 the Court refused to extend the scope of the common commercial policy -and, hence of the EC competences -to trade in services, although such a "dynamic" and functional interpretation of Article 133 EC would have been both possible and, it is suggested, perfectly consistent with the ratio legis of the EC Treaty.
In Ban of Tobacco Advertising, 18 the ECJ decided to apply strictly the conditions contained in Article 95 EC, which is the main EU power allowing for the harmonization of Member State regulations which hamper the establishment and/or the functioning of the internal market.
In each of these cases the ECJ reduced -or refrained from fully exploiting -the potential scope of important Treaty provisions. They appear, thus, to provideat least partially -an answer to the criticisms formulated by some scholars, national cour ts, and even the Union's pouvoir constituant. The ECJ indicated with these decisions that it is capable of and ready to refrain from a more dynamic interpretation of EU primary law -which has much helped to stabilize the "European project" during its first decades of existence -and instead to adopt a stricter, more text -oriented approach.
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C. The UPA Judgment: A New Example of Judicial Self-restraint ?
The UPA judgment issued on July 25, 2002 -which became, somewhat unexpectedly, one of the most important cases decided by the ECJ during the last year -may be read as a new step in the ECJ's move away from its previous "law maker"-stature. In order to analyze the extent to which the UPA judgment may be a new example of judicial self-restraint (the theme discussed in section V. below), I will briefly outline the facts of the case (section I.) and the main legal problem raised by the case (section II.), describe the reform proposals and the position adopted by the ECJ (section III.) and assess the Court's solution of the problem (section IV.).
I. Facts
An association of Spanish farmers ( UPA) sought the annulment of an EC regulation which discontinued an agricultural aid scheme and which did not require a national application measure. ECR I-615), the latter being the 'default position' (at 500). mere fact that it is possible to determine the number or even the identity of the producers" concerned by the general measure. 31 Historically, the ECJ's approach can be explained by the fact that the drafters of the EEC Treaty decided, under German influence, to endorse a more restrictive standard on locus standi than they had done in the preceding ECSC Treaty.
32
One has also to understand that the ECJ showed little enthusiasm for allowingat least in the founding phase of the Community -individuals to challenge legislation that was the result of difficult political compromises reached within the Council under the rule of unanimity. 33 Furthermore, a restrictive approach on standing allowed not only the ECJ to avoid having to exercise control over norms of a discretionary nature -in particular in the sensible field of common agricultural policy -but also to filter incoming actions. 
Criticism of the Court's Dogmatic Approach
Critics of the Court's approach 39 argue that the Treaty's system of remedies is in fact not as complete as the ECJ suggests.
In fact, there appear to be several lacunae in the system of judicial protection as 
III. Reform Proposals and the ECJ's Position
While the reform proposals made by AG Jacobs and the CFI advocated a relaxation of the standing requirements, the ECJ preferred to maintain the traditional, limited conception described above.
AG Jacobs in UPA and the CFI in Jégo-Quéré: Relaxing the Standing Requirements
Confronted with individual requests for judicial review of directly applicable EC acts, which appeared not to be challengeable before national courts, both AG Jacobs in UPA and the CFI in Jégo-Quéré proposed to operate a radical change in the Court's case law and to soften the strict interpretation of the notion of "individual concern" contained in Article 230 (4) EC.
AG Jacobs' proposal was less radical. He stated that: Both proposals sought liberalize the interpretation of individual concern. While the CFI would have required that the incriminated measure affect the applicant's "legal position," AG Jacobs' formula referred only to the applicant's "interests." On the other hand, the AG would have demanded that the measure 46 AG Jacobs C-50/00 P UPA at 60. 47 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré at 51.
have a "substantial adverse effect" while the CFI accepted a " definite and immediate" restriction. It is difficult to assess the differences between the proposals. These differences depend upon the exact definition of the notions employed -in particular those of "legal position" and "interests" -which are, however, not more fully articulated by the AG and the CFI.
These proposals marked, however, a very interesting stage in the European
Courts' search for the proper definition of individual standing. Both interpretations aim at abandoning the focus on the drafting and on the possible addressees of the EC act under review -a perspective which has too often proven to lead to rather unconvincing results. 48 Instead, they suggest that the "standing test" should analyse, when assessing the individual concern of an applicant, the specific applicant's situation under the contested act.
The ECJ in UPA: Maintaining the Restrictive Approach to Individual Standing
The ECJ refused to follow these proposals and to soften the standing requirements as they have been developed in the Court's case law interpreting the notion of "individual concern" contained in Article 230 (4) EC. 49 Instead, the Court continues to insist on the "cooperation model" of judicial protection in the EU as established by the EC Treaty and its complete sys tem of judicial remedies.
In spite of this "conservative" approach, the ECJ did not deny the assertions of AG Jacobs and the CFI according to which there lacunae do (or may) exist in the EU's present system of judicial protection. However, the ECJ refused to avoid them by means of a revirement de jurisprudence, instead assigning this duty to the Member States: to which an applicant must first make an appeal, will nonetheless be obliged to refer questions on the validity of EC acts to the ECJ. The Court's decision accomplishes all of this while at the same time endangering fundamental rights because (efficient) judicial protection may be left too much to the discretion of national judicial systems and/or the "sensibility" of national judges.
On closer inspection, the ECJ's approach may, however, present fewer shortcomings than the more radical solution of centralizing the judicial protection of individuals at the EU level. The Court's solution requires, however, some further clarifications in order for it to work in a satisfactory manner and to grant effective judicial protection.
The Reform Proposals in the Light of the ECJ's Functional Limits
50 Case C-50/00 P UPA at 41 and 42.
Relaxing standing requirements would allow individuals to avoid the "national track" and instead challenge EC acts directly before the ECJ. As already noted, such a centralization of judicial review is advocated, first, in order to enhance efficiency (as the detour via the national judge is a waste of time and resources) and, second, in order to reduce the risk that the existence of judicial protection is left to the discretion of the national court.
However, one has to bear in mind that the capacities of the ECJ are limited. The
Court already suffers some from a crowded docket, which will certainly increase as a result of the future constitutional reforms and the next enlargements. 51 There are good reasons to consider that the ECJ's capacities will not be enhanced to match the expansion of its jurisdiction and mandate. . These numbers may not be very impressive compared to those of some of the Member States Supreme Courts. However, one has to bear in mind that the ECJ (as all institutions of the EU) has to deal with a serious "language problem" unknown in other judicial systems. Although the Court itself has one single working language (French), all parties and interveners as well as the AGs can submit their observations and conclusions in the ten official languages of the EU. Finally, also the Courts' judgments are to be translated into the different languages. Some lawyers appear to exploit this situation by submitting very voluminous observations in order to expand the length of the procedures. It may perhaps also be useful to recall the wide field of subject matters covered by t he Court (according to the Statistics): agriculture, approximation of laws, arbitration clauses, association of the overseas countries and territories, commercial policy, common customs tariff, company law, competition, culture, customs union, energy, envi ronment and consumers, European citizenship, external relations, fisheries policy, foreign and security policy, free movement of goods, industrial policy, freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment, freedom of movement for persons, intellectual property, justice and home affairs, law governing the institutions, principles of Community of law, regional policy, research, information, education, and statistics, social policy, social security for migrant workers, staff regulations, state aid, transport, taxation. 52 In particular the language problem will increase greatly with the next enlargement convened upon during the In the light of the functional limits of the ECJ one cannot deny that relaxing the standing requirements would have resulted in overburdening this jurisdiction and, thus, likely reducing rather than increasing the efficiency of judicial review at the E U level. The Court's solution avoids such risks.
Assessing the ECJ's Approach in UPA
The functional limits of the ECJ -and perhaps also subsidiarity argumentsplead in favour of the ECJ's solution which combines limited access to the European Courts for individuals with a duty of national courts to grant effective judicial protection.
However, it is submitted that this approach will only work in a satisfactory way provided that two conditions are met. First, as acknowledged by the Court itself, national courts have to grant effective judicial protection. Second, the ECJ should ensure subsidiary judicial protection in those cases in which protection is not granted at national level. Although it is doubtful that such a duty can be derived from Articles 13, 6 ECHR and Article 6 (2) EU, I would suggest that the EU bears, even if one accepts a decentralized system of judicial protection, the primary responsibility of granting such protection against its own legal acts. One can therefore conclude that the ECJ may be ready to ensure that the first of the two conditions identified above as necessary for a proper functioning of a decentralized system of individual judicial protection will be met: that national cour ts actually grant such protection.
However, this system should be completed by a kind of "safety net" in the form of a subsidiary judicial control of the ECJ in cases in which national courts fail to comply with their duty. 
UPA: Opting For A -Still Incomplete -Decentralized System of Judicial Protection
If there are good -mainly functional -reasons justifying the ECJ's choice to maintain its restrictive approach towards individuals' standing under Article 230 (4) EC and to opt for the traditional decentralized system of judicial protection, one has nevertheless to state that this system still appears to be incomplete.
As noted above, it is not sufficient that the ECJ interprets the duty of sincere cooperation in a way which will oblige the national courts to re-interpret -and even the Member States legislatures and parliaments to modify -their national procedural rules in order to make sure that national judges will be able to grant effecti ve judicial protection against EC acts. However, the ECJ should develop criteria allowing it to grant subsidiary protection in the case of "Member State failure" since the EU bears the primary responsibility to ensure effective judicial protection against its own acts.
Granting subsidiary judicial protection for individuals challenging EC acts raises two problems. First, to define the exceptional situation in which such a protection has to be granted and, second, to define a less strict interpretation of "individual concern" which applies to these exceptional cases.
The first problem can be resolved in the sense that such an exceptional situation can be recognized when the individual has been denied access to the national courts. This means, from a practical point of view, that future plaintiffs will have to challenge the EC act before both the national court and the CFI in order to make sure that their action will not be inadmissible for reasons of delay (Article 230 (5) EC); the CFI will in turn only deal with that action when the national court refuses the individual's action as inadmissible.
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The second problem is more difficult to resolve as it returns to the fundamental question to which extent standing requirements have to be softened in order to make s ure that effective judicial protection is granted. The "default interpretation" of individual concern confirmed in UPA cannot apply to these exceptional cases, in which judicial protection has not been granted by the national courts since the ECJ's strict approach presupposes, precisely. the existence of such a national control. I would suggest that the Court should admit in these cases one of the formulae proposed by AG Jacobs and the CFI. Such a preferential access to the CFI should, however, only be opened when the national court refused to review the individual's action. Once it has examined the question of individual implications of the incriminated EC act, the individual has been granted access to justice and does not necessarily need further protection by the European Courts.
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Such a solution appears to be apposite to a decentralized system of judicial protection such as emphasized by the ECJ. Relaxing the standing requirements in those cases which have been dismissed as inadmissible by national courtswhich will be required, more than in the past, to allow the review of EC actsappears to be a fair compromise between the functional limits of the ECJ, on the one hand, and the obligation of the EU to grant effective judicial protection against its acts, on the other hand.
V. UPA -Self-restraint or Self-protection ?
In our previous analysis of the UPA judgment we have exclusively focused on its main substantive aspect -the defense of the ECJ's restrictive approach towards individuals' standing under Article 230 (4) EC within a still incomplete system of decentralized judicial protection. However, this case is also interesting under the aspect of the "constitutional dialogue" taking place between the ECJ and the pouvoir constituant. In fact, the UPA judgment is exclusively based on one main argument: the limits of the Court's competences (discussed below in subsection 1). This argument, however, is hardly convincing (subsection 2).
The Main Argument of the ECJ: Limits on Its Competences
60 Should individuals be consistently refused access to national judges this would constitute a violation of the duty to grant effective judicial review one can derive from the UPA judgment. As in the case of continuous breach of Article 234 EC by national courts of last instance, the Commission may then file an action against the Member States.
The Court referred twice to limits on its competences, which, following its line of thinking, preclude any increased flexibility regarding the standing requirements for individuals.
Regarding possible exceptions to its strict rule of admissibility in cases of appeals against general EC measures applying directly and which, thus, at least in principle, cannot be challenged by individuals before national courts, the ECJ noted:
"Such an interpretation would require the Community Court, in each individual case, to examine and interpret national procedural law. That would go beyond its jurisdiction when reviewing the legality of Community measures."
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As to the reform of the whole system, the Court conceded that: "… it is, admittedly, possible to envisage a system of judicial review of the legality of Community measures of general application different from that established by the founding Treaty and never amended as to its principles," but then stated that "it is for the Member States, if necessary, in accordance with Article 48 EU, to reform the system currently in force." This limited extent of the reform -which should ensure that the decentralized system of judicial review advocated by the ECJ meets the principle of access to justice -also casts serious doubts on the Court's assertion, according to which, any change of its case law would amount to a "substantive modification" of the Treaty's system of judicial review. However, even admitting this point, one has to ask whether such a "substantive" modification indeed requires a formal Treaty revision or not. The ECJ's own case law on Article 230 EC suggests a negative answer.
Taking the Court's "limits of competences"-argument in the UPA judgment seriously, the ECJ would not have been competent to endorse the various (although modest) liberalization of the standing requirements for individuals, as it did e.g. in Codorniu. 63 The same applies to several substantial modifications to the system of judicial review established by the founding Treaty which have resulted from the ECJ's case law; the most famous example of such a "dynamic interpretation" in this field being the Chernobyl case. 64 This judgment conferred to the EP a limited right of standing, which was absent in the former EEC Treaty, in order to secure a "fundamental interest" 65 of the Community.
One can, thus, hardly see why a limited liberalization of standing requirements aimed at maximizing access of individuals to justice in the decentralized EC system of judicial review could not also be accomplished by means of judicial interpretation.
Should one, thus, read the UPA case as a new element in the Court's move away from a "law maker" stature and towards a judicial restraint approach?
There is an important objection to such an understanding: in line with other judgments based on the duty of sincere cooperation, the ECJ has expanded In order to measure the importance of this change, it may be useful to remember that the ECJ's "law maker approach" was based on two interconnected premises. First, the Court operated from the premise that the Treaty had established an autonomous legal order in spite of the fact that it contained some important lacunae. Second, the Treaty was to be interpreted accordingly and loopholes were to be filled by means of judicial interpretationat least as far as this was not done by the Community law makers and/or the "Masters of the Treaty" (both being, to a large extent, identical under the regime of the Luxembourg compromise). Their "failure to act" -the " carence du législateur" (Judge Pesactore) -justified, during many years, the ECJ's "lawmaking" approach.
Following this line of argumentation, the ECJ's margin for "law making" was logically to decrease the more the pouvoir constituant was itself tackling the problem of "constitution building". As already noted, the "Masters of the Treaty" have well accepted and even codified most of the "constitutional pillars" built up by the ECJ. However, they have also shown some signs of scepticism in particular by limiting the Court's powers in the new fields of competences conferred to the Union.
The appearance of the pouvoir constituant as a permanently present player since the beginning of the 1990s reduced, hence, the ECJ's role in the "constitutional dialogue". More than in the past, the Court is to limit its "lawmaking" role to those fields and issues in which it could expect that its Second, UPA appears to acknowledge that the Court's margin of manoeuvre for "law-making" has been reduced by fact that it has to act within the particular political context of a permanent constitutional reform process.
From this follows a third consideration, namely, that the ECJ does not believe that the pouvoir constituant has already "failed to act" although it has chosen to ignore its invitation to address the question of individual standing before the European Courts. This makes clear that stating a " carence du législateur" in times of permanent constitutional re-adaptation is much more problematic than it has been in the first decades of the EC characterized by a stable constitutional framework. Moreover, the ECJ was to decide the question of individual access to justice at a critical moment in which the reform process was just entering into a new qualitative phase: on the one hand, the choice for the discourse; on the other hand, the mandate of the Convention is nearly unlimited.
It follows that the Court's decision in UPA not to proceed to a substantive change of its approach towards individuals' standing under Article 230 (4) EC takes perfectly into account these new circumstances. Given the broad mandate of the Convention composed in its large majority by democratically accountable "players" it would have been very unwise to intervene by judicial means in a question which the Court has "marked," some years ago, as a "political" one to be addressed by the pouvoir constituant. Moreover, one may guess that the ECJ used its relatively strong -in another context rather unconvincing -"limits of competences"-argument in order to put the question again on the reform agenda.
If this was the Court's intention, it has succeeded: one day after the ECJ's judgment in UPA, the European Ombudsman made a reform proposal.
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Relaxation of standing requirements for individuals was then discussed in the Convention's working group dealing with specific aspects of fundamental rights. 81 In its final report, the group acknowledges that "a certain lacuna of protection might exist" but agreed that "the present overall system of remedies, and the 'division of work' between Community and national courts it entails,
should not be profoundly altered by a possible reform." 82 The group considered that the question "certainly has a nexus with fundamental rights" and EC in the sense that locus standi should be granted to an individual challenging a regulatory EC act "which is of direct concern to him without entailing implementing measures"
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. However, its members remained divided on the question of whether or not to extend such protection to "an act of general application". 87 It is, thus, to be expected that a limited -but nevertheless significant -liberalization will be proposed by the Convention to the next IGC.
E. Conclusion
In sum, the UPA judgment can neither be entirely understood as being a new example in line with previous cases following a judicial-restraint approach nor UPA marks the Court's use, for the first time, of a new kind of voice in its "constitutional dialogue" with the Union's pouvoir constituant. This development coincides with the entry into the next phase of the European integration process which adopts a new method of constitutional reform, the "convention method."
